Expansion of crops of Khrushchev corn. "Corn Madness. What will we do with the received material?

The era of Khrushchev was remembered as a time of continuous and complex economic and political experiments. The exposure of Stalin's "personality cult", the legendary slogans "we will catch up and overtake America", "in 20 years the Soviet people will live under communism", etc. "Kuzka's mother" and the blow of shoes on the podium of the United Nations. An integral part of the image of Nikita Khrushchev was the "corn epic". This is when "even in the Far North they sowed corn." This epic lasted from 1955 to 1962.

Khrushchev began to actively introduce corn in the Soviet Union after his famous visit to the United States in 1955. In America, the Soviet leader met the farmer Garst. Khrushchev was deeply impressed by the American cornfields. There is evidence that it was from Garst that Khrushchev borrowed the expression "corn is the queen of the fields." Then he decided to plant corn in the USSR. On September 1, 1956, an all-Union seminar on corn opened in Moscow. Then Khrushchev called for the first time to grow corn from Kazakhstan to Taimyr.

The positive thing about the "corn epic" was that Khrushchev thus lifted the "iron curtain", recognizing the need to borrow Western technology. However, immediately, "in the best traditions", he began to prove the superiority of "our", the collective farm way, over their farming. In the USSR, perhaps the most pressing development problem at that time was the problem of hunger. Khrushchev considered the widespread cultivation of corn almost a panacea for food problems. In one of his speeches, the first secretary blurted out: “Corn, comrades, is a tank in the hands of fighters, I mean collective farmers; it is a tank that makes it possible to overcome barriers, overcome obstacles on the way to creating an abundance of products for our people.” The first secretary personally visited the collective farms and recommended to the villagers where and how to plant corn.

Such an “unhealthy” love for corn is explained, first of all, by the fact that, in addition to the grain cob, it has a huge stalk, which is very profitable to use for livestock feed. Khrushchev thought in this way to make a quick breakthrough both in grain farming and in animal husbandry. They forgot only one thing: corn is a heat-loving plant.
... The call of the first secretary to breed corn led to the fact that they began to promote it everywhere, even in the northern latitudes - the Arkhangelsk region, in Yakutia and Chukotka .... Khrushchev considered his program to promote corn to the northern latitudes an important means of solving the problems of livestock fodder.

As a result of Khrushchev's experiment, the area devoted to corn more than doubled and in 1962 amounted to 37 million hectares instead of 18 million hectares in 1955. This was more than the area of ​​plowed virgin lands. The result was sad: the sowing of traditional crops - wheat and rye - was reduced, and the problems of agriculture could not be solved. The second bread (as Khrushchev hoped) did not become corn.
In itself, the decision to focus on corn farming was not at all stupid. Today, in the United States, corn is harvested five times as much as wheat. An attempt to adopt progressive experience from abroad in Soviet realities turned into another expensive experiment, and is still considered stupidity in the mass consciousness. The state bodies simply overdid it in the “cornification” of agriculture, which caused, of course, the public rejection of such a policy. The cult of corn has failed….

... "The plant called cokerusa"

It turns out that long before Khrushchev, the issue of corn was raised at the domestic top. The spread of corn was first attended to 200 years ago by the Russian emperor Alexander I. Documents on this subject have been preserved in the Russian archive of ancient acts. In 1802, Radetsky, a student at the Medico-Surgical Academy, sent Count Muravyov, the emperor's educator, an essay on the properties of "a plant called cokerus."

The author, just like Khrushchev one hundred and fifty years later, believed that the cultivation of corn - “coqueruza” was quite capable of solving the bread problem in the Russian Empire. But... Count Muraviev thought about the essence of the issue and concluded: the plant "cokerusa" is "very convenient for breeding in all climates and can serve as a great benefit during crop failures." But - “can this plant be moved from the southern regions of the empire to others”? These same questions arose much later before Khrushchev. And so the Medical Board issued a conclusion on the work of the student Radetzky: corn “according to many observations of natural scientists, cannot grow in the northern zone of the Russian Empire, because more than summer warmth is required for the perfect ripening of these fruits.” Unfortunately, what was obvious two hundred years ago was not understood by the Soviet leader in the 1950s.

Kukutsapol is a male name!

The list of Soviet names - remakes that appeared after the revolution of 1917, easily replaces a long summary of "bearded" anecdotes. ... There is a semi-legendary story dating back to the time of Khrushchev. As if there lived a certain Kukutsapol Stepanovich Krivoruchko, a native of the Krasnodar Territory. His father, a simple tractor driver on a state farm, was so inspired by the "corn epic" that he gave the name of his son - Kukutsapol (CORN - Queen of the Fields). In short - Cook ... And this Kukutsapol graduated from the Veterinary Academy, "went to exchange experience with America, met a Peruvian there, married her and, in the end, emigrated to a place where his name did not surprise anyone."

And still there was such an anecdote. The Americans flew to the moon. And they began to look closely at what to build where. That's where the Statue of Liberty will stand, and there - the White House and the Capitol, even further - the Pentagon. Suddenly, a native inhabitant of the Moon, selenite, crawls out from somewhere. “Late! A bald man flew in here. I looked around and ordered - everything is under the corn!

Years have passed ... Comrade Khrushchev has not been with us for a long time, but the story of the massive cultivation of corn is firmly embedded in the minds of the people. If you subtract the juggling and primitive bureaucratic approach from the whole semi-anecdotal “corn epic”, what remains is the useful practice of cultivating a valuable agricultural crop. Khrushchev simply made an unsuccessful attempt to learn from the American experience in agriculture.

Maxim KAVUN

To the liquidation of "unpromising" villages, the virgin epic, one can also add "corn madness", "meat campaign" and "dairy records", which finally crippled agriculture. In the Soviet Union, there was a problem of forage crops, and Nikita Khrushchev declared corn a panacea for all ills. In many ways, he was influenced by a trip to the United States, where corn was one of the main crops. In 1955-1962. sown area under corn doubled. To do this, it was necessary to reduce the crops of other crops.

Moreover, corn was sown even in those regions that were not suitable for this agricultural crop in terms of natural and climatic conditions. So, jokes even arose on this topic: “Well, Koryak brothers, are we sowing corn?” “We are sowing,” answered the Koryaks, putting on their fur coats. Khrushchev did not want to hear about crop failures. Those leaders who could not ensure the corn harvest were removed from their posts. Therefore, many leading workers, in order to keep their posts, wrote about high yields, went for forgeries, postscripts.

The development of virgin and fallow lands, according to Khrushchev and his supporters, was supposed to solve the problem of grain. Since these places were sparsely populated, the new state farms could not plan multilateral farming here, but only wheat monoculture with a high level of mechanization of all work and the transfer of people from traditional agricultural areas and years for temporary seasonal work. For the future, of course, the task was to fully develop and populate these lands, but this could take many years. And the country needed to sharply increase the production of not only grain, but livestock products. The main brake on the development of animal husbandry was the lack of proper amount of feed. Khrushchev and his advisers on agriculture (the main role among them was played by A. S. Shevchenko, his assistant on agriculture from the time of Khrushchev’s work as Secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine) knew well that in the USA it was corn that was the main fodder crop, and with an increase in its production was associated in the United States with the rapid development of animal husbandry. So, until the second half of the 1950s, corn in the structure of grain crops in the USSR barely reached 15%, and, for example, in North America it was more than 35%, in Australia and South America - more than 30%. This structure was dictated by the traditions of agriculture and geographical and climatic conditions.

It is worth saying that Khrushchev was a typical Westerner in this regard, that is, he saw something good in the West and immediately wanted to instill it on Russian soil, regardless of natural and climatic conditions, traditions and experience. In this respect, the Russian liberals of the 1990s-2000s and the Trotskyists-Khrushchevites-Gorbachevites are the same berry (poisonous).

Already in 1955, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR introduced the post of "agricultural attache" at most of the embassies of the USSR, and a lot of information and proposals for reforms accumulated along this line in the Central Committee of the CPSU and in the agricultural ministries. In addition, numerous agricultural delegations and excursions were sent to the United States and other countries, led by ministers of agriculture and their deputies.

Even at the plenum in September 1953, Khrushchev proposed a significant increase in the area under corn for grain in the Ukraine and in the south of the USSR, and in other regions for silage. However, despite increased propaganda, corn crops in the USSR in 1954 grew by only 800,000 hectares, reaching an area of ​​4,300,000 hectares. On collective farms and state farms, where corn had not previously been cultivated, it was treated with caution and only experimental plots were sown. This approach was quite reasonable and justified, since there was no mechanization for the cultivation of corn yet, and its cultivation required a lot of manual labor. This irritated Khrushchev. Under his pressure, the Central Committee of the CPSU gave a directive to expand the sowing of corn in almost all agricultural areas by almost several times. Although there were no conditions for such a program: there were not enough silos, equipment, fertilizers, good seed material, people and just experience.

However, this did not stop Khrushchev and his supporters. Violating the newly adopted new procedure for planning work, which allowed the collective farms to decide on the distribution of crops independently, taking into account local conditions and opportunities, the collective farms and state farms were given very high tasks from the district committees and district executive committees for sowing corn in 1955. At many meetings and conferences in the spring of 1955, Khrushchev recalled the eighteenth-century experience of forcibly introducing the potato. As a result, corn crops increased in 1955 in leaps and bounds, reaching about 18 million hectares. Far from everywhere, the experience of growing corn in 1955 was successful, but a relatively hot year (with drought in the south and east) was favorable for this crop. In the south, a significant amount of not only silage was harvested, but also grain, success in growing green mass for silage was also noted in some collective farms and state farms in the middle non-chernozem zone and in the Baltic states. This allowed Khrushchev to continue the "corn" offensive. In 1956, a further increase in sown areas was planned. The summer of 1956 was dry in the European part of Russia, so the year was not unfavorable for corn.

On this wave of the first apparent success, which was seen as a serious victory for the agriculture of the USSR, the campaign was continued and expanded. Everywhere they planned the construction of new silos, the development of feeding livestock with corn silage, special machines were created for the mechanization of work, and the production of clean lines of corn was established. In Ukraine, a special Maize Research Institute was established, and a pavilion "Corn" was allocated at the Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow. The Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR began to publish a special magazine with that name. The food industry has expanded its line of products and canned corn. In Moscow, they even opened a special large store "Corn". As a result, corn, like virgin soil, has become a symbol of the coming rapid rise in animal husbandry and agriculture in general.

On May 22, 1957, in a speech at a regional meeting of agricultural workers in the regions and autonomous republics of the USSR, Khrushchev promised to catch up and overtake America in three years in the production of meat, milk and butter per capita. It was about competition in the production of meat and dairy products. Instead of the grass-field crop rotation system, traditional for almost the entire USSR (except for Central Asia), it was recommended at the meeting to switch to fast, wide and widespread sowing of corn. This was opposed by academician T. D. Lysenko, but his arguments were called in the press "dogmatism, disbelief in the possibilities of Soviet agriculture and a relapse of thinking during the period of Stalin's personality cult."

It was not too difficult to catch up with the US in butter and milk production. In the States, consumption of butter and milk has been declining for many years, Americans have been increasing the production and consumption of vegetable oil and margarine. Therefore, in 1957 butter production in the USSR and the USA was almost at the same level (at the same time, the production and consumption of butter and milk in the USA was 2-3 times lower than in European countries). But in terms of meat production, the USSR lagged far behind the United States. And Khrushchev's call to eliminate this gap in 3-4 years was unrealistic to fulfill. In 1957, the USSR produced 7.5 million tons of meat, or 36 kg per person. And the US produced 16 million tons of meat this year, 97 kg per person. Thus, the USSR had to increase meat production almost three times in three years. Khrushchev hoped mainly for the growth of fodder resources, especially corn. However, the task he set was from the realm of fantasy, not real life.

In 1957, the USSR did not yet have real conditions for the rapid development of animal husbandry. In 1953, procurement and purchase prices for meat, milk, and butter were significantly increased, but still the cost of production of these products in all agricultural regions of the country was higher. As for meat, the high cost of production was associated with poor mechanization of work, the absence of modern farms on collective farms and state farms, a lack of fodder, and other factors. For example, retail state prices for meat were still low, and collective farms did not have a profit to expand the reproduction of livestock. All problems were solved, but not by emergency methods. On livestock farms on collective farms, manual labor prevailed. Only 5% of the work was carried out with the help of machines and mechanisms. It is clear that these problems could be solved. Animal husbandry could be raised by systematic and long-term work, and not in 2-3 years.

Khrushchev himself allowed only a year's delay: “There will be no tragedy if, for example, in 1960 we still cannot catch up with America in meat production. Some delay can be allowed, it would not be bad to solve this problem in 1961 as well. However, in 1961 we must, as they say, clean up the "remains", and do the main work in 1960. We need to muster up the courage and resolve this issue.”

However, the increase in meat production, for objective reasons, in the second half of 1957 and in 1958 was very modest. In 1958, meat production in the country increased by only 300 thousand tons, that is, by less than 5%. This caused Khrushchev's extreme irritation. He counted on 60-70%. Decisive measures were demanded of all regional committees in order to sharply increase meat production in 1959.

This led to disaster. The first secretary of the Ryazan regional committee, A. N. Larionov, at the end of 1958, at the regional party conference, promised to increase meat production by 2.5 times in a year, and meat preparations - by 2 times. The idea was supported by several other areas. According to unofficial data, Larionov was even promised the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. The region was awarded the Order of Lenin. Larionov gathered the leaders of agriculture and set an even more difficult task - in one year to increase the production of meat on collective farms by 5 times (!), On state farms - almost 4 times and exceed the plan for the sale and state supply of meat 3 times! The Ryazan Region, which sold 48,000 tons of meat to the state in 1958, promised to sell 150,000 tons of meat in 1959. The editors of the Pravda newspaper did not even want to publish these new increased obligations of the region, and the agricultural department of the Central Committee opposed this, which considered them overstated and unrealistic. But on the personal instructions of Khrushchev, these obligations were published in Pravda on January 9, 1959. In this regard, Khrushchev began to put pressure on other regions to increase their obligations. Thus, the Stavropol Territory assumed obligations to increase meat production by 2.5 times in 1959, and the Krasnodar Territory did the same. The Moscow region promised to increase production by 2 times, as did the Byelorussian SSR, etc.

It is impossible to increase such a large number of farms, the number of livestock in a year and to feed the livestock well to increase weight gain. However, Moscow's heightened scrutiny and excessive publicity in the press made retreat impossible. And in order to fulfill the promise to increase meat production in the region by 4-5 times, it was necessary to slaughter almost all cows and pigs from collective farms, which is a crime. In the Ryazan region, in order to fulfill this promise, they ordered to write off for meat not only the increase in the livestock of 1959, but also a significant part of the dairy cows from the so-called. "broodstock". In addition, tens of thousands of cows and pigs were forcibly bought from peasants' private farms. However, this was not enough. I had to buy cattle in neighboring regions up to the Urals. The purchases had to spend funds that were allocated for construction, health care and education. But even this was not enough. Neighbors also gave increased obligations and were alarmed when they learned about the actions of the Ryazan "purveyors". On the borders of the Ryazan region, they even began to set up police posts that took away illegally purchased cattle.

A fivefold increase did not work. Then the Ryazan Regional Committee imposed a meat tax not only on collective farms. State farms and private farms, but also obliged to produce meat to all institutions, including schools and police stations. Everyone urgently began to breed rabbits. At factories and enterprises, people often simply collected money, went to the store and bought meat (at 1.5-2 rubles per 1 kg), and then they took it to procurement centers, where the meat was taken at 25-30 kopecks. for 1 kg. The same operations were carried out with oil. As a result, meat, butter and milk disappeared from stores in the region. But the plan was carried out. In December 1959, the region reported that meat production had "increased" by 4 times and 150 thousand tons of meat were transferred to the state, three times more than in 1958. Larionov received the Hero of Socialist Labor. He was praised. Even in school textbooks, the "feat" of the Ryazan region was urgently entered.

The next year, the region pledged to further raise the bar - up to 180-200 thousand tons. However, the agriculture of the region, due to the emergency measures of 1959, fell apart. The livestock population has fallen sharply. Collective farmers and workers of state farms, who were given receipts instead of money, did not go to work, demanding either to give up their livestock or pay full monetary compensation. The cash funds of the collective farms were exhausted. Many collective farms simply went bankrupt. The region could not give even half of the usual annual plan, that is, it delivered about 30 thousand tons, 6 times less than promised. Other jobs failed as well. The grain production plan was only 50% fulfilled. When at the end of 1960 a special commission of the Central Committee of the party arrived in the region to check the state of affairs, it confirmed complete collapse of agriculture in the region. Larionov committed suicide.

Thus, Khrushchev's policy in the field of meat production caused great damage to the country. Not only Ryazan, but also other regions suffered. The total meat production in 1960 compared to 1959 was 200 thousand tons. In 1961, it remained at the level of 1959. Only in 1962 was there a slight increase. Ryazan experiment, repeated in 1959-1960. and in other areas of the country, had negative consequences. In 1964, 8.3 million tons were produced, that is, less than in 1959. The production of eggs and wool in 1964 was also below the level of 1959. The gap in the amount of meat production per person between the United States and the USSR grew even more.

Nikita Khrushchev had a good personal relationship with John F. Kennedy

Already in 1957-1959. the area under corn was increased by about a third - due to the sowing of industrial crops and forage grasses. True, at that time this initiative covered only the North Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova. The process has not yet reached the "northern seas". It must be said that a moderate expansion of corn crops would not bring harm. However, Khrushchev here too "went too far" until it broke.

On a visit to the United States in September 1959, Khrushchev visited Iowa in the fields of the famous farmer Rockwell Garst. He grew hybrid corn, which gave a very high yield. Khrushchev was so blinded that he called a meeting at the USSR Embassy in Washington, where he criticized our diplomats and analysts for their inattention to the "corn" experience of the Americans and ordered that the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture be literally flooded with American materials for the cultivation of corn. According to contemporaries, Khrushchev at the embassy, ​​and even upon arrival in the USSR, was literally distraught. He urged: “resolutely change local leaders who themselves withered and dried corn. Well, what did we do in agriculture after Stalin? Yes, virgin soil, but this is not enough. Why are we worse than the Americans? Thanks to corn, they have no problems with animal husbandry and grain farming. Why are our fields or our climate worse? And after all, they also write letters to me that, they say, it is not possible to sow corn everywhere, its adapted varieties are needed, they ask to keep grass-field crop rotations. Isn’t this dogmatism and sabotage?”

As a result, since 1959 corn has been promoted all the way to Arkhangelsk and Karelia. In fact, it was a complete outrage not only on the agricultural traditions of Russia, but on common sense.

True, initially there were significant successes in places. So, in the States and Canada, hybrid varieties of corn were bought, which were successfully introduced in the North Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova. They gave high yields - half as much as traditional Soviet varieties, and this dramatically improved the supply of feed for livestock, significantly increasing its productivity in these regions already in 1958-1959. However, the "miracle" quickly ended. Americans and Canadians have already begun to raise prices for seeds since 1959. Khrushchev's attempt to "agree" on their cost during his visit to the United States did not lead to success. Therefore, Soviet purchases abroad came to naught already in 1960.

The consequences were disastrous for the country's agriculture and food security. Since traditional crops were replaced by corn, instead of an abundance of milk and meat in the USSR, there was a shortage of them everywhere, except for Moscow, Leningrad and nomenclature food distributors. As well as the lack of most traditional Russian cereals. The "corn madness" had a negative impact on the number of cattle and pigs.

Already by 1964, at least 60% of the corn crops produced in 1960-1962 had died, and the yield of existing corn fields was half that in 1946-1955. Therefore, already in 1962, regular, and growing, imports began, including from North America of grain, including corn, and meat raw materials. Russia-USSR planted on imports. On the other hand, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites called scientists who openly opposed the all-Union corn epic "charlatans" and "armchair bureaucrats." Therefore, if at the beginning they still tried to report to Khrushchev about the negative trends in the corn campaign (as well as virgin and other campaigns), then soon, due to his tough and narrow-minded position, local leaders not only closed the channel of cautious criticism, but also began to report only " positive".

And since 1960, numerous false reports have been sent to the Kremlin about record corn harvests, about unprecedentedly large gains in animal husbandry, and about one hundred percent supply of farms with feed. As well as the fact that Soviet varieties of corn are much better than North American ones. An orgy began with the assignment of titles, other awards, and prizes. At the 21st Congress of the CPSU, the pioneers delivered a poetic greeting: “To raise calves and match us, we work with the whole class. We also want to catch up with America in meat!” Already in the 70s, it came to the point that dissertations were defended on the long-term benefits of grain imports - and primarily from the USA.

Soviet statistics were forced to hide the real state of affairs and trends in the economy, especially in agriculture. This information most often appeared under the heading "For Official Use". In order to somehow cover up the situation, since 1961, prices for livestock products, bread and cereals began to rise. Collective farms, especially livestock farms, were transferred to state farms or transformed into state farms, and cattle and pigs began to be “withdrawn” from the farmsteads of collective farmers and private households of townspeople at symbolic prices. In addition, taxes were introduced on poultry in collective farms and private households, which were canceled only in 1965. The lack of acceptable premises for keeping a large number of animals, the poor state of the forage base, and the financial conditions unfavorable for the peasants for the delivery of livestock and pigs to the state led to the mass slaughter of animals (including poultry) in private farmsteads. It is clear that these measures could not change the situation. It is worth noting that Stalin, in his last book, The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, published in 1952, called such ideas “Khlestakovism” and “gibberish of crazy Marxists.”

It is not surprising that the "reforms" of the Khrushchevites led to a crisis in the livestock industry of the whole country, from which it did not fully recover until the collapse of the USSR (and then agriculture was again cut down, but already liberal "reforms").

A blow to Orthodoxy

Khrushchev's "thaw" was marked by a new wave of persecution against the Russian church. The actions were led by the main ideologist of the party M. A. Suslov. Churches began to close again throughout the Soviet Union. They were given for warehouses, storage facilities, clubs, etc. If under Stalin mutual understanding was established between the state and the church, and the number of operating churches reached 20 thousand, and many churches were reopened, then under Khrushchev there were just over 7,500. Arrests resumed priests, believers.

A powerful blow was dealt to the Old Believers. The Old Believers, who did without priests (bespriests), were declared "sectarians". The prayer houses of the Old Believers were closed, their communities were destroyed. From the territory of the Old Believer settlements, ancient icons of the 17th-18th centuries, ancient church books and manuscripts were taken out in masses. Many of them were invaluable, as they contained information about genuine

Corn is a type of annual herbaceous plant of the cereal family. Corn is a culture of high productivity and versatile use. Corn grain contains 9-12% protein, 4-6% fat (up to 40% in the germ), 65-70% carbohydrates, yellow grain varieties contain a lot of provitamin A.

Until the second half of the 1950s, corn in the structure of grain crops in the USSR barely reached 15%, and, for example, in North America it was more than 35%, in Australia and South America - more than 30%. This structure was dictated by the traditions of agriculture and geographical conditions.

In 1956, the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev put forward the slogan: "Catch up and overtake America!". It was about competition in the production of meat and dairy products. Instead of the grass-field crop rotation system, traditional for almost the entire USSR (except for Central Asia), it was recommended at the meeting to switch to fast, wide and widespread sowing of corn.

In 1957-1959, the area under corn was increased by about a third - due to the sowing of industrial crops and forage grasses. At that time, this undertaking covered only the North Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova.

On a visit to the United States in September 1959, Khrushchev visited Iowa in the fields of the famous farmer Rockwell Garst. He grew hybrid corn, which gave a very high yield. Khrushchev urged to use the "corn" experience of the United States.

Since 1959, corn crops began to expand rapidly (in 1956, 18 million hectares were allocated for them, in 1962 - 37 million hectares), displacing traditional grain crops and forage grasses. Corn was sown even in the northern regions, up to the Vologda region, although this crop is thermophilic and practically does not produce grain north of Moscow. At the same time, hybrid varieties of corn were bought in the USA and Canada, which were successfully introduced in the North Caucasus, Ukraine, and Moldova half more than the traditional Soviet varieties - dramatically improved the feed supply of livestock, significantly increasing its productivity in these regions already in 1958-1959.

For a while, the “queen of the fields” took over the country: corn flakes, corn sticks, corn bread, corn sausage. There were films about corn, poems and songs.

In 1960, due to an increase in prices, purchases of American and Canadian seeds stopped, it was decided to introduce Soviet varieties improved by North American technology everywhere.

Already by 1964, at least 60% of the corn crops produced in 1960-1962 had died, and the yield of the "remaining" corn fields was half that in 1946-1955.

After Leonid Brezhnev came to power, corn was almost completely ousted from the country's arable land - even in those areas where it had always been successfully grown. As a result, by the beginning of the 1970s, the area under corn fell to the lowest level in the 20th century. In the 1970s, corn was actually grown in Russia only in the North Caucasus. However, the high yield of grain crops continued to be a weighty argument in favor of its cultivation, and therefore, in the 1980-1990s, the area of ​​cultivation of this cereal began to expand. Currently, corn for grain is grown in the Chernozem zone, the Middle Volga region, the Southern Urals, as well as some areas of the Far East (Amur region, Khanka lowland).

The idea of ​​a radical change in the structure of grain crops, primarily through an increase in corn plantings, in the minds of Soviet people is inextricably linked with the personality of Khrushchev. Motivating the need for a sharp increase in corn crops, Khrushchev appealed to the American experience, seeing in it another "recipe for all diseases at once." "Corn, comrades," he emphasized in one of his speeches, "is a tank in the hands of fighters, I mean collective farmers; it is a tank that makes it possible to overcome barriers, overcome obstacles on the way to creating an abundance of products for our people." The stake on corn was explained by the fact that, in addition to the grain cob, it also has a stalk with green mass, which can be used for livestock feed. "Monoculture" was thus seen as a condition for a "breakthrough" in both grain production and animal husbandry.

Indeed, the policy of the party in the countryside has never been carried out so earnestly and zealously as during the years of the "corn epic" - from 1955 to 1962. "Queen of the fields" corn by force planted absolutely everywhere, up to the northern regions of the Arkhangelsk region. During these years, the area under corn more than doubled and reached 37 million hectares by 1962, exceeding the total area of ​​plowed virgin and fallow lands. Strict regulation from above, unquestioning instructions on where and what to sow, have led to the fact that the sowing of wheat and rye in traditional agricultural areas has decreased, and the total grain harvest has decreased. The "corn epic" is the most striking example of economic fetishism and voluntarism, but not the only one. In the same years, the "saving" method of planting plants, the free keeping of cows and separate harvesting of grain, as well as the elimination of clean fallows, were introduced everywhere and diligently to increase the productivity of agriculture.

"Catch up and overtake America!"

The American experience haunted the new Soviet leader. In 1957, speaking in Leningrad, Khrushchev formulated the most important task of the moment: "To catch up and overtake America in the production of meat, milk and butter per capita!" It was a pure political adventure, the purpose of which was to demonstrate to the whole world the advantages of socialism after the recent events in Hungary and Poland. Economic voluntarism has had serious consequences for the development of animal husbandry. The fulfillment of odious appeals often turned into a tragedy: the entire livestock was slaughtered, the scale of postscripts expanded, and the falsification of statistics became commonplace. Local party leaders often became hostages of the situation. Thus, the secretary of the Ryazan Regional Committee, Larionov, publicly promising to "catch up and overtake America" ​​in a short time, ordered to slaughter all the livestock in the region, including dairy pigs. Having received the star of the Hero of Socialist Labor for "unprecedented success", Larionov shot himself.

Liquidation of mts

However, Khrushchev continued to implement his ideas in the countryside. Their essence, as already noted, was to create large industrial-type farms with a powerful machine and tractor base. Since the time of collectivization, all agricultural machinery has been concentrated in the MTS, where there was its own repair base, tractor and combine operators worked, serving several nearby farms. The MTS system was, of course, far from perfect and needed to be reformed. But the decision taken by Khrushchev marked the beginning of a new stage in the destruction of the collective-farm-state-farm system, which meant the final rejection of the course of the September 1953 plenum and interrupted the positive dynamics of agricultural production. In March 1958, a law was passed on the reorganization of the MTS and the sale of equipment to collective farms. According to him, the farms were forced to buy back from MTS all the equipment, often already outdated and worn out, at high prices in one year. Overnight, all farms, with rare exceptions, became unprofitable. This led to a reduction in wages per workday. There was no more talk of any economic incentives for the labor of collective farmers. The state instantly returned to itself all the funds invested in the development of the village in previous years. Agricultural production fell sharply, and its growth amounted to over the seven-year period 1959-1964. only 15% instead of the planned 70%. Contrary to forecasts, qualified machine operators did not go to work in unprofitable collective farms, but tried to get a job in the regional center or left for the city.

Corn is a valuable agricultural crop that provides food for both livestock and people. Nevertheless, during the reign of Nikita Khrushchev, it was the “queen of the fields” who brought the Soviet Union to the issuance of bread on ration cards, and this in peacetime! The fact is that the Soviet climate was categorically not suitable for corn - neither natural nor political.
September 7 marks 65 years since Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev took over as first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In March 2016, the Levada Center conducted a survey: respondents were asked to answer which events that occurred during his tenure in power, they remember the most. In the first place, predictably, was the space flight of Yuri Gagarin, the second was the development of virgin lands, and the third were expensive and unsuccessful experiments in agriculture. Khrushchev and corn are remembered more than "Khrushchev" or the debunking of Stalin's personality cult.
It is believed that the idea to sow almost the entire territory of the USSR with corn came from Khrushchev during a trip to the United States. But interest in this culture, according to the ex-head of the country's own recollections, arose in his youth, when he became a fitter's apprentice at the Machine Building and Iron Foundry near Yuzovka (now Donetsk). “Corn was the main crop for feeding livestock. It used to happen that a Ukrainian goes to the market in Yuzovka, grabs a bag of corn and, of course, a trough in a cart, then pours cobs into the trough, and the horses gnaw the corn,” Khrushchev wrote in his book “Time. People. Power (Memoirs). In 1955, Khrushchev spoke at the plenum and talked a lot about animal husbandry. He set the Americans as an example: they are doing business much more successfully than us, and therefore they don’t line up for meat. And the editor of one of the newspapers published in the state of Iowa went further and even invited Soviet collective farmers to come to the USA. Khrushchev decided to send a delegation of agricultural scientists to the States to collect agricultural "intelligence". At the end of the trip, the delegates presented a report, one of the main places in which was given to corn. When in 1956 Khrushchev demanded to “catch up and overtake America” in terms of meat and milk production, there were no questions about how to feed this army of cows, pigs and other livestock.
By 1959, the area occupied by corn had increased by about a third - at that time it replaced only industrial crops and forage grasses. Landings were placed in the North Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova. In the same year, Nikita Khrushchev spent two weeks in the United States, where he managed to visit Roswell Garst's farm in Iowa.
It was not by chance that he ended up there - in 1955, after the departure of the Soviet delegation from the States, the USSR invited American farmers. Garst obtained permission to travel to the USSR and even the right to trade. The farmer met with Khrushchev and persuaded him to buy 5,000 tons of corn kernels. They paid in gold bars - there was nothing more to pay with.
Khrushchev's son, Sergei, in the book Nikita Khrushchev. Reformer," recalls:
“The fact that my father puts his hand into the gold pantries, I learned soon after his return from vacation. He, in my presence, discussed with one of his colleagues the benefits of the deal made with Garst. I got angry...
My father listened to me benevolently and replied with a quote from Eugene Onegin: How the state grows rich, And how it lives, and why, It does not need gold, When it has a simple product.
Since 1959, corn plantings in the USSR began to grow almost exponentially: if in 1956 18 million hectares were allocated for them, then by 1962 - 37 million hectares. Corn was sown not only in the south of the country, but also in the northern regions, up to the Vologda Oblast, although it did not ripen well in the local climate. Only in Western Siberia, corn crops from 1953 to 1960 increased from 2.1 thousand hectares to 1.6 million hectares, while the yield was 7.5 q / ha.

For the North Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova, hybrid corn seeds were purchased in the USA and Canada, which gave large yields, and for a while this made it possible to solve the problem of feeding livestock in these regions. But already in 1960, imported seeds became too expensive, and Soviet seeds had to be planted.
The whole country was captured by "corn fever" - films and cartoons were made about it, poems and songs were written, and corn champagne, sticks, bread, cereal and even corn sausage were presented in stores. Corn appeared both in children's amateur performances and on propaganda posters - for example, with the slogans "Let beans walk around the Union in an embrace with corn" and "Each heifer for corn."
It would seem that the construction of communism was in full swing (in 1961, Khrushchev assured at the 22nd Party Congress that it would be completed in 20 years), feed for livestock in the form of corn silage was found, and, consequently, a bright future awaited people. But everything turned out to be not so simple - in the south, corn gave excellent harvests, but in the north they could not boast of success. Just as important, corn supplanted other essential crops, and this eventually led to a shortage of bread.
“The failure was due to the very mechanism for implementing the idea of ​​the chairman of the Politburo. The political situation of those years assumed unconditional, automatic conciliation with the initiative party, its Central Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee. Therefore, as they said back in Stalin's times, "excesses on the ground" not only took place, but prevailed. It should also be taken into account that, by the time of Khrushchev's leadership, the Soviet school of genetics in crop production, plant breeding scientists, the breeding school as a whole were largely either physically destroyed (the clearest example is Nikolai Vavilov) or brought under the "administrative line". The implementation (ideologically, in terms of materiel) was not headed by specialists, in fact, planting (without taking into account the properties of the soil and often climatic conditions) was carried out by student, volunteer Komsomol detachments - they did not have special specialized training, ”explains Natalia Soboleva, director of the NRA corporate ratings department.

If in 1955-1959 Soviet agriculture showed an annual growth of an average of 7.6%, then during the years of Khrushchev's reforms and innovations (1959-1962), this figure fell to 1.7%. In 1962, the “queen of the fields” already occupied 37 million hectares, but in most of the Non-Chernozem and eastern regions, the entire corn crop was lost. For the needs of livestock, corn turned out to be a help, which had a positive effect on the state of animal husbandry.
“Some people in the USSR did not understand me before and do not understand me now. There are those who condemned me then and condemn me now. I think it's due to ignorance. They do not understand that there is no other crop equal to corn for animal husbandry. It may be objected that not everywhere. Yes, but the main thing is the people. In the same climatic region, corn does not grow in one person, while in another it produces 500 and 1000 centners of silage mass. To put it bluntly: for a smart one, it has an effect, but for a fool, oats and barley will not grow, ”Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs.
In the fall of 1962, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the allied Council of Ministers issued a decree “On putting things in order in the expenditure of grain resources”, limiting the sale of bread to 2.5 kg per person - there was no longer enough grain for grinding. “The consequences of thoughtlessly following the directives“ from above ”were catastrophic. I remember well how, as a child, I stood in line for bread - there was gray bread, black too, but there was no white. Rolls were given either by coupons or in accordance with the norms of leave. I was then 7-8 years old, and in one hand I could get two white rolls for 7 kopecks. To do this, it was necessary to stand two lines - one to the cashier, the other to issue, because there might well not be enough bread. On TV they showed clogged store shelves - they say, look, there is bread. But these were photographs taken before people entered this store,” Alexander Bessolitsyn, professor of the Department of Economic History at the Institute of Social Sciences of the RANEPA, shared his memories with Gazeta.Ru.
In 1963 the situation worsened. Due to crop failure, the gross grain harvest amounted to only 107.5 million tons (30% less than in 1962), and the yield dipped from 10.9 to 8.3 centners per hectare.
“The country is on the brink. There was no talk of a famine comparable to the famine of 1890, but my father had no time for reforms. In 1963, all efforts were reduced to how to hold out until the new harvest, ”Sergey Khrushchev writes in his book.
According to him, not only white bread disappeared from the shelves, but also semolina, vermicelli and other products.
“The crop failure of 1963 hit hard on the authority of the father. Still, two years ago he promised to build communism, and now you won’t find decent bread in the store. And free bread disappeared from canteens, as they explained - temporarily, only for a year ... Contrary to the facts, people suddenly began to think that under Stalin they lived better, ”complains Sergey Khrushchev.
The USSR had to buy grain from the capitalists.
“All together amounted to about 12 million tons. Getting rid of hunger cost 372.2 tons of gold out of the 1082.3 tons of cash available for that year,” Sergey Khrushchev calculated.
In mid-October 1964, the Pravda newspaper reported that the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU granted Khrushchev's resignation. After Leonid Brezhnev came to power, corn was almost completely ousted from arable land - it was no longer grown even in those parts of the country where it had been done for a long time and successfully.